

















The Cantle Report, a report commissioned by the then British Home Secretary in the aftermath of so-called “race riots” in some northern English towns and cities during 2001 involving second generation Pakistani-Muslim male youths, neighbouring white communities, members of far-right organisations, and the police (McGhee 2008, 83), uncovered a picture of deep division across the country. The report noted that “many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone promote any meaningful interchanges.” (Home Office 2001, 9). Undoubtedly the comments of the Cantle Report, especially those which made reference “to the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities”, drew strong resonance with many people living in Northern Ireland. Such patterns of polarisation could almost be said to have been the exclusive property of this “divided society”, noted by a deep conflict of often violently competing ethnonational aspirations. The historically embedded patterns of segregation and division are most clearly witnessed in Belfast, the capital of Northern Ireland. It is here where so-called “peace walls” separate the two groups and where the vast majority of the city’s residents live in districts that are overwhelmingly Catholic or Protestant. In the most intensely divided parts of the city, such as North Belfast, research has shown that as many as 68 per cent of young people claim they “have never had a meaningful conversation” with those of the other religion.​[1]​
In the light of contemporary anxieties regarding endemic ethnic divisions in English cities and in Northern Ireland, this chapter compares and considers the potential of St Patrick’s Day celebrations (hereafter SPDCs) in two locations (Belfast and London). In particular, the chapter assesses celebrations in these cities to contribute towards projects concerned with facilitating shared spaces, identities, inclusivity, and meaningful cross-community dialogue. I explore how SPDCs in both locations are imagined by organisers as engendering cultural pluralism, wide levels of community participation, intercultural tolerance, and civic belonging. Notably, however, while SPDCs in London have proved relatively successful in this task, managing to draw up to 100,000 participants, the city-council sponsored event in Belfast has been the focus of bitter acrimony and contest, as Unionists and Nationalists battle over the control and meaning of the celebration. 
It could be argued, then, that Belfast could beneficially learn from the example of the state-sponsored London’s St Patrick’s Day celebrations. The London organisers’ success in creating inclusivity and a shared ritual could provide a model for Belfast, where division, conflict, and animosity have dominated proceedings. Contrary to this logic, I argue that it is mistaken to correlate the dynamics of societies divided by ethnonationalism with those societies concerned with perceived problems arising from cultural difference and pluralism. The difference between two different types of “divided societies” can be summed up as those in which contests are fundamentally based on issues of pluralism and those in which the basis for conflict is sovereignty (Morrissey and Gaffikin 2006). In societies and cities characterised by conflicts over pluralism contests concern disputes about imbalances in power, welfare, and status between the groups. In societies defined by conflicts over sovereignty, there are similar pluralist disputes about equity and access, but these are interlocked with an ethnonational conflict about the legitimacy of the state itself. In the former category are global cities like Chicago, Paris, and London, where ethnicity is a pronounced fault line in these cities’ historical narrative and contemporary discourses. Examples of the latter would be Jerusalem and Belfast, cities that both host and hone the macro contest about nationality (Morrissey and Gaffikin 2006). Northern Ireland and Belfast are marked by a deep conflict of nationality. Citizens are largely divided into two national communities with opposing political aspirations: Irish Catholic Nationalists who aspire to Irish unity and British Protestant Unionists who desire to remain part of the UK union. The dominant tendency within both national traditions is to deny legitimacy to the aspiration of the other (S. O’Neill 2001, 222). 
A crucial distinction between societies characterised by contests over pluralism and sovereignty further concerns proposed conflict-resolution strategies. Suggested solutions by policy makers to the issue of diversity in pluralist societies typically concentrate on fostering a sense of common belonging that is not based on ethnic or cultural roots, but rather on a shared commitment to the political community. This emphasis can be seen, for example, in a report by the Commission for Racial Equality (Beunderman and Lowensbrough 2007) commissioned to provide strategies to deal with ethnic division in Britain. The authors of the report look for a “vision of living together” by forging “common belonging to a citizenship that can embrace diversity but still engender solidarity” (Johnson 2007, 4). This emphasis on what McGhee (2005, 163) has called a “differentiated universalism” has become the defining policy of the UK state in terms of multiculturalism. A “differentiated universalism” depends on ethnic “boundaries remaining present, but requires that they must be flexible, and, importantly, open to change”. In other words, while ethnic diversity is tolerated, groups should nevertheless be forced to engage in intercultural contact and cross-community dialogue in order to disseminate core British vales and the virtues of community cohesion.  
The applicability of “differentiated universalism” for divided societies noted for contests over national sovereignty is limited. In Northern Ireland, in which the “state is itself the subject of apparently irreconcilable political differences” (Graham and Nash 2006, 25), forging a common political and civic British (or Irish) community seems implausible. The aim of “encouraging flexible or complex meta-loyalties above and beyond competing micro-loyalties” (McGhee 2008, 84) in ethnonationally divided societies must, consequently, involve an alternative to the glue of national civic identity. The emphasis on conflict resolution in such societies is not only on promoting the recognition and validity of the cultures and identities of the opposing factions in the public sphere, a considerable amount of energy is further placed on forging forms of political sharing between the two groups. In places fraught by violent ethnonational conflict, like Northern Ireland and Lebanon, peace-building, loosely defined, is based on “consociational” (McGarry and O’Leary 2004) forms of governance that institutionalizes political power sharing between ethnonational groups as well as promoting some group-differentiated cultural rights. Rather than engendering civic unity through diversity, such consociational frameworks are often vehemently critiqued for exacerbating conflict over identity and culture. Critiques typically focus on how consociationalism provides “weak democratic moorings [that have] unintended polarising effects and which have been readily exploited by those with a determined sectarian and/or paramilitary agenda” (Wilford and Wilson 2006, 32). Instead of facilitating a radical departure from ethnonational division, consociationalism is accused of reducing relationships between Nationalists to Unionists to that of “benign” or even “malign apartheid” (Graham and Nash 2006). 





The close geographical proximity between Ireland and Britain has for many centuries acted to induce generations of Irish migrants into London. The steady drip of Irish migrants into London escalated exponentially in the wake of the Irish famine during the mid-nineteenth century. The ensuing influx of starving Irish into Britain meant that by 1880 there were over a million Irish born people in Britain, with 66,465 recorded in London – though twice the figure would seem more realistic. Since then, taking into account the second generation, the Irish population in Britain has constantly remained over one million (Nagle 2009a). Irish settlement in London continued during the early part of the twentieth century. The colossal programme of rebuilding post-war Britain precipitated, in particular, a new generation of Irish workers into London. Seeing that even the initial burst of Irish into Britain’s workforce was not sufficient, a staggering 500,000 left Ireland between 1945 and 1981 (Delaney 2000), many heading to Britain to fill, as they always had done, the least desirable jobs. 
Irish settlement in London and in Britain, however, has often been problematic. A major issue contributing to troubled relations between the migrant Irish and the host nation was the context of English colonisation in Ireland and successive generations of struggles for national determination by Irish Nationalists. Hickman (2000) has argued that the Irish in Britain have been racialised by the host nation to the extent that they have provided an inferior “binary opposite” identity to Britishness. Because anti-Irish sentiment is always historically specific, the construction of negative Irish stereotypes has frequently been connected to the moral justification of English colonisation in Ireland (see Curtis 1984). The apotheosis of anti-Irish prejudice was nineteenth-century scientific-racism in which the Irish, in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon English, “were collectively figured as racial deviants, atavistic throwbacks to a primitive moment in human history” (McClintock 1995, 43). In more recent times, forced as they were within the matrix of the conflict in Northern Ireland since 1969, and with IRA bombs detonated in London, the London-Irish were viewed as a “suspect community” (Hillyard 1993) prone to excessive panoptic surveillance and distrust by the British state authorities and media. The most visible manifestation of observation was  the 1974  Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) that deterred the Irish in Britain from political activity by practically making Irish Nationalist persuasion indivisible with Irish republican militancy (Nagle 2009a). Within this milieu, anti-Irish sentiment flourished, filtered by a complicit media only too willing to portray crude stereotypes and jokes of the “stupid and violent Irish” (Curtis 1984). 
This background historical information is provided in order to illuminate the context in which major SPDCs have emerged in London. For many London-Irish community leaders the appropriate response to perceived discrimination and negative stereotyping was to provide a new positive identity of Irishness that would counteract prejudice. The roots of this project can be traced back to the 1980s. To deal with disadvantages affecting the London-Irish, London-Irish agencies mobilised to gain recognition within state-sponsored multiculturalism. State-sponsored multicultural policies developed exponentially in London with the selection in 1981 of Ken Livingstone as a left-wing leader of the then city-wide government, the Greater London Council (GLC). Under the leadership of Livingstone, the GLC sought to develop an institutionally multicultural profile as part of his commitment to nurturing municipal socialism in the city. From 1980 to 1984 the annual funding of voluntary organisations by the GLC rose from £6 million to £50 million. Significantly, the GLC provided “a significant impetus for the increased activism of the Irish in London by recognising the Irish as an ‘ethnic minority’, thereby legitimating the funding of specifically Irish welfare and cultural projects” (Gray 2000, 71). By 1985 there were in the region of thirty Irish funded projects in London, and, by 1988, over £3 million had been provided by the GLC to fund Irish “community projects” (Nagle 2009a). Groups such as the London Irish Commission for Culture and Education sought to “identify and articulate the special needs of the Irish in London in the areas of culture and education, and to develop an anti-racist programme that will reflect the history and heritage of the Irish” (London Commission for Culture and Education 1987). State-sponsored multicultural initiatives, such as festivals, arts, and educational classes instructing Irish history and culture were instigated by the London-Irish to increase their profile and visibility in the capital city. Although these programmes intended to instil a sense of pride in the London-Irish, they also aimed to forge links with other “minority” groups as well as the host nation. Writing in the 1980s, Liz Curtis sums up the importance of what she saw as the “strength of culture” for the London-Irish:

It is … helping to build links with Londoners from other cultural backgrounds, and is encouraging increasing numbers of non-Irish people to sweep away their accumulated misconceptions to join in the task of working to build a new future. (Curtis 1987)

This strategy of making Irish culture and arts inclusive was assisted by the exponential globalisation of SPDCs and other forms of Irish popular culture from the 1980s onwards. The role of multinational breweries, especially the marketing strategies of Guinness, was central to the proliferation of St Patrick’s Day in particular. They marketed SPDCs as an inclusive celebration, in which “everybody is Irish for the day” (Nagle 2005), thus adding to its visibility and mass appeal. This nascent popularity of all things Irish could be used as a format both to showcase the Irish and to forge relationships with other “communities” (Nagle 2008). Another important strand to the strategy of inclusion was the Northern Irish peace process. The activation of the peace process in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s, hesitant though it may have been, impacted upon the Irish in England in so far as they were no longer seen as a suspect community. In this milieu, diasporic Irish groupings in other English cities, like Manchester, Bristol, and Birmingham inaugurated major SPDCs, with as many as 500,000 people attending celebrations in Manchester (Nagle 2005). 
A particularly important impetus for the London parade was the ascendancy of Ken Livingstone as the leader of the Greater London Authority, London’s new city-wide government. In 2001, Livingstone held a meeting with 90 Irish community organisations to outline a joint strategy to garner support from Irish businesses and community organisations in London for a festival. Shortly afterwards, the GLA’s Cultural Events Programme budget agreed to provide a gross contribution of £135,000 towards the overall cost of the celebrations (£235,000) as part of its commitment to advocating multiculturalism, anti-racist policies, and instilling a shared sense of London identity. The GLA’s sponsorship of St Patrick’s Day is detailed in policy reports by its Cultural Strategy Group. The document London Cultural Capital: Realising the Potential of a World Class City (GLA 2004) places a strong emphasis on cultural activity in the city to provide, predictably, a means to “brand London”, to raise revenue by promoting itself as a world cultural city and tourist destination. The report also encourages cross-community dialogue by laying stress on how culture “can bring together people with different backgrounds, transcending barriers and celebrating difference” (GLA 2004, 18). The instigation of London’s first major St Patrick’s Day Parade in 2002 was self-consciously promoted as a multicultural ritual spectacle. Encouraging inclusivity, the organisers stated:

[t]he Irish in London have always played a key role in many facets of society. There could never be a better time to celebrate the rich tapestry of life in our multicultural capital and we would like to extend a warm invitation to all Londoners to join the Irish community in celebrating this special day. (GLA 2002)

Routing the celebration through central London was planned to maximize London-Irish visibility, and to develop a positive representation of, and a public focus on, Irishness – necessary for securing the government funds. Such visibility of the Irish in London was considered to represent the formal acceptance of the Irish contribution to “multicultural” London, when previously the Irish have been rendered invisible as a “suspect community”. The parade, GLA leader Ken Livingstone subsequently acknowledged, helped some with “no Irish roots … come away with a better understanding of the contribution the Irish have made to London” (Murphy 2005). Routed past the Houses of Parliament, Whitehall, and Downing Street, and ending in Trafalgar Square, the parade journeyed through “the very heart of London” (B. O’Neill 2002).


Belfast’s St Patrick’s Day parade

Like London, major SPDCs have been initiated in Belfast City centre in recent years. Similar to the London-Irish, the struggle by one group, in this case Irish Nationalists, to gain official support for SPDCs is connected to issues concerning visibility and cultural recognition. More conspicuously different, as I will demonstrate, the framing of these issues are constrained by the ethnonational conflict over sovereignty, i.e. the constitutional position of Northern Ireland. In order to illuminate this difference with more clarity, I provide some background context to the development of St Patrick’s Day in Belfast and the acrimonious struggle for control over its ownership and performance. It is important to first contextualise the Belfast SPDC within the history of ethnonational conflict that exists in Belfast and Northern Ireland.
 Northern Ireland was formed in 1921 as the result of the partition of Ireland. The two jurisdictions, the North and the South, were formed in order to make a compromise between the seemingly irreconcilable national aspirations of two ethnonational groups in Ireland: Ulster Unionists, who demanded that the political association with the UK remain; and Irish Nationalists, who demanded Irish independence. Partition was viewed as a transitional interim phase by Irish Nationalists, until the whole of Ireland was unified; or as the best possible permanent solution by Ulster Unionists. Within the borders of Northern Ireland there was a substantial minority population, numbering roughly 30 per cent, who refused to recognise the political legitimacy of Northern Ireland and instead expressed allegiance to another sovereign state – the Irish Republic. These Irish Nationalists had many of the perks of citizenship denied them by the dominant Unionist government, who viewed this minority as a threat to the security of the state (Purdie 1990).
Included in Nationalists’ grievances was a lack of official recognition for Nationalist culture by the state (Nic Craith 2002). Such cultural exclusion was most apparent in the Flags and Emblem (Display) Act (NI) of 1954, which forbade the public display of so-called “provocative emblems” in Northern Ireland. This Act had the de facto intention of proscribing the use of Nationalist symbols in public spaces, without formally specifying what might constitute a Nationalist symbol’ (Purdie 1990, 30). Key public spaces – such as Belfast City Centre – were an interrelated arena that Nationalists were proscribed from, and were largely preserved for Unionist civic events (Nagle 2009b). In this way, access to public space surrounding the City Hall for cultural and political displays became the spatial analogy of citizenship. The issue of gaining access to civic spaces for the purposes of celebrating Irish identity became a central mobilising point for Nationalists. As part of this emerging struggle, the first St Patrick’s Day Parade in Belfast occurred in 1969 and was routed through a Nationalist district. The parade was organised by a group called the James Connolly Flute and Drum Band, who stated that the purpose of the parade was to have St Patrick’s Day recognised as a national holiday in Northern Ireland (Irish News, 18 March 1969).
The outbreak of civil conflict in Northern Ireland in 1969, euphemistically known as “the Troubles”, brought to the fore the deep contest over sovereignty. A hitherto dormant Irish Republican Army (IRA) was renewed late in 1969; proclaiming to defend Nationalists against sectarian attacks, militant Irish Nationalists instigated an armed offensive, asserting that only through the overthrow of the state, and a consequent United Ireland, could civil rights for all be achieved (English 2003). Militant Loyalists, proclaiming to be defenders of the Union, reciprocated with a barely concealed sectarian murder campaign against Catholic Nationalists. 
While SPDCs in the city had been limited to the one experiment in 1969, 1977 witnessed the re-emergence of a parade in Nationalist west Belfast. The revival of SPDCs in Belfast in 1977 was part of an ongoing cultural-political strategy to promote Irish heritage and ethnic pride amongst Irish Nationalists. In the mid-1970s three Irish nationalists in Belfast set up the St Patrick’s Day Association, whose mission was to organise an annual St Patrick’s Day parade in nationalist west Belfast. The Association was to state that “the parade is open to any individual, group or association with an Irish identity” (Irish News, 16 March 1981). Although the 1977 parade featured traditional Irish step-dancers, traditional Irish musicians, carnival floats, and a host of marching bands, the parade also had a clear political function. Some floats, featuring men and women imprisoned in small cages, were designed to bring public attention to the plight of political prisoners. The end of the parade also hosted a number of political speeches by Irish Republicans. 





From the 1980s onwards, St Patrick and the celebration were central points of identification for both Unionists and Nationalists, and a fundamental crucible of contestation over who had the right to proclaim ownership over such public symbols. A layer of complexity regarding celebrations in Belfast came with the emergence of the peace process in the 1990s, and also the changing dynamics of political representation in Belfast city. In the 1970s and 1980s the Nationalist organised St Patrick’s Day Parade was confined to Nationalist districts of West Belfast, while the Nationalists demanded that the parade should be moved to the city centre. This space was particularly important for many Nationalists because it was perceived to be exclusive to Unionist civic occasions (Nagle 2009b). As such, the exclusion of Nationalist performances from the city centre was for many Nationalists the spatial analogy of what they claimed was their “second-class” status as citizens in the city. SPDCs thus became a highly important tool through which Nationalists tested issues of civic inclusivity. 
Nationalist demands for cultural recognition and inclusivity, especially in terms of access to public space, were assisted by the growing level of Nationalist political participation at the level of the local city-wide government. Instead of viewing the City Hall purely in terms of an “impenetrable bulwark of a ‘Protestant state for a Protestant people’” (Hayden 1999, vii–viii), militant Nationalists, especially Sinn Féin, the political wing of the IRA, began to slowly advocate positive and participatory input into formal politics at the city-wide level. The state, rather than seeing as beyond reform, could be made more amenable to Nationalists through the politics of accommodation and inclusion (Bean 2008, 78). In the space of twelve years from 1985 to 1997, Sinn Féin almost doubled its number of electoral seats in the city council and transformed itself from one of the smallest parties to the largest party in the city of Belfast. In 2001, the first Sinn Féin mayor was elected. This commitment to politics at the local level was mirrored by the nascent peace process. Eschewing the rhetoric of exclusion, Sinn Féin increasingly articulated a politics of pluralism and diversity by speaking of “a shared city of equals” (Bean 2008). Central to this project of creating “a shared city of equals” was the demand for equal access to the City Centre. In July 1993, an umbrella group of Nationalists applied for permission from the security forces to hold what they called a “Nationalist Rights Day” on 8 August, including a march into the City Centre and a political rally to be held outside the City Hall. Speaking prior to the parade, Alex Maskey, a leading member of Sinn Féin, stated that they would seek to show that one of the main injustices experienced by Nationalists in Belfast “was not being allowed into our own City Centre unhindered. We’re now taking that step.” (Irish News,  7 August 1993).
With the advent of Nationalist events in Belfast City Centre, it was inevitable that more pressure would be applied to include more Nationalist organised events such as St Patrick’s Day. Nationalists expressed a strong opinion that the St Patrick’s event should garner some form of state funding. The first St Patrick’s Day Parade to take place in Belfast City occurred in 1998. However, despite the Nationalist organisers barring political symbols and speeches from the event, in an attempt to make the event inclusive to Unionists, some of the media noted the strong presence of Irish Nationalism in the parade. For instance, it was noted that the flags of Saoirse, an Irish Republican prisoners’ group, were visible in the parade. For Unionists, therefore, the parade appeared exclusive and unaccommodating. For Unionists, the celebrations appeared little more than a display of Nationalist “triumphalism”. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Councillor Nelson McCausland typified the Unionist view by noting in a council meeting that the celebrations had not been inclusive, expressing particular concern at the flying of certain flags and the political element of some of the floats. The flag that had reportedly caused Unionists most concern was the Irish tricolour, the flag of the Republic of Ireland. Even though the Irish tricolour was not used in an official form during celebrations, the sight of many in the crowd – and some in the parade – flying the tricolour was evidence that the space and celebration were neither neutral nor inclusive.
For Irish Nationalists, on the other hand, access to the city centre represented the moment when Irish cultural identities were endowed with equal recognition alongside Unionism. A Nationalist newspaper stated:

The tens of thousands who turned Belfast city centre black with green on Tuesday were doing more than scribbling footnotes, more than even contributing whole chapters to our history. They were shedding the pages of past wrongs, binning the Belfast of … second-class citizenship. (Ó Muilleoir 1998).

The criteria for state funding of events routed through the City Centre were loosely defined through notions of inclusivity. In other words, event organisers should strive to ensure that events are inclusive to all communities in the city. Since Unionists felt the event to be exclusive and even hostile, the cross-community support required to engender support for funding failed, as Unionist groups withdrew support for the initiative. Belfast City Council rejected claims to fund the event for 1999. Denied council funding, the Nationalist organising committee struggled to gain sponsorship. In 2004 acrimony over the parade became intense. Nationalist grievances remained focused on what they perceived to be Unionist ill will. Irish Nationalists expressed frustration with Unionist intransigence regarding the funding of the parade, going as far as to call it an act of “blatant anti-Irish racism” and “a step back to the dark days of unionist misrule and domination” (An Phoblacht, 6 January 2000). For Gerry Adams, the President of Sinn Féin, the Unionist refusal to support funding of the parade was a denial of “positive political positions on equality and recognition of nationalist rights” (An Phoblacht, 6 January 2000).


Pluralism and sovereignty revisited

In one sense, SPDCs in London and Belfast share a common concern: the expression of cultural diversity by groups that feel that they have been prohibited access to the public sphere by the “dominant culture” that controlled the polity. The dominant culture, in this synopsis, imagined society in its own ethnic image by constructing, as far as possible, a homogeneous and monolithic public culture and politics. This public culture and politics was inherently exclusivist in terms of suturing ethnic identity with the project of state building. In Britain, like many other modern nation-states, this form of ethnic exclusivity was forged through the Westphalian mode of state craft. By this I refer to a view of “liberal democratic citizenship” in which, as Purcell (2003, 565) elaborates, “individual political actors agree to a social contract with the state in which they consent to be ruled in exchange for certain privileges and protections”. As a reward for submitting their political allegiance to the nation-state, the individual actor is afforded some institutionalised say in the decisions in the state, usually manifest in the state’s electoral system. Although the individual can be a member of numerous cross-cutting political communities, inevitably they must all be subordinated to their membership to the nation. The Westphalian nation-state was inherently predicated on an imagined ethnically homogeneous membership, to which members of minority ethnocultural groups were supposed to assimilate rather than maintaining their original cultures and identities. The cultures and identities of migrant groups, like the Irish, Afro-Caribbean, South Asian, and others, were therefore historically excluded from the public sphere and relegated to the private domain. Such states did little to provide, as critics argue, a neutral and equitable civic realm in which one nation and one citizenship was constructed out of the diverse cultures of different peoples – e pluribus unum (“out of many, one”). Rather than the liberal state managing to slough off its ethnically particularistic skin to emerge in its culturally cleansed, universalistic form, the neutrality of the liberal state was achieved through the maintenance of a dominant ethnos. 
In a society like Northern Ireland, a process of ethnic exclusion was also forged by the state builders. However, rather than the state being established through Westphalian principles, the development of Northern Ireland was analogous to that of an “ethnocracy”. An “ethnocracy”, Yiftachel and Ghanem (2004, 249) note, is a regime “facilitating the expansion, ethnicisation and control of contested territory and state by a dominant nation”. What primarily distinguishes ethnocracies from other state-building projects is “the strong emphasis on ethnic loyalties as a foundation of politics” (2004, 249). 
So, in London as a part of a society defined by contests over pluralism, and in Belfast as part of a society marked by conflict over sovereignty, the struggle of minority groups excluded from the state-building project is to pluralise and democratise the public sphere with their cultures, which have been historically rendered as invisible and incompatible with the self-professed identity of the state. The emergence of SPDCS in London and Belfast can, consequently, be viewed in terms of such struggles. For the London-Irish the appearance of state-sponsored SPDCs in the centre of London represents the official recognition and validity of Irish cultural identity in public life. Similarly, the inclusion of SPDCs in the city centre of Belfast, a space once clearly proscribed to Irish Nationalists, represents for Irish Nationalists the equal validity of so-called Irish cultural traditions and identity, therefore threatening the hegemonic dominance of unionism in the city and indeed the state.
 In this light, it is tempting to view the struggles to constitute SPDCs in London and Belfast as indicative of “multiculturalism”. In a limited sense, multiculturalism refers to how societies have sought to manage diversity by endowing minorities some form of group-differentiated rights – which often include the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula, the inclusion of ethnic representation on the mandate of public media or media licensing, and affirmative action (Kymlicka 2007, 74). At one level, SPDCs in London and Belfast are both part of this process to encourage societal diversity and inclusivity by facilitating equal notions of the “good life”.
 This basic level of similarity between SPDCs in London and Belfast should not divert us from their differences. The fundamental one, as noted at the beginning of this chapter, concerns struggles over pluralism and conflicts over sovereignty. A major source of difference, as we have seen, is with regard to how the events are seen as indicative of specific forms of group-differentiated claims. For migrant groups, in particular, their aim is not to become a separate and self-governing nation outside of or alongside the larger society, but to modify the institutions and laws of the mainstream society, to make them more accommodating of cultural differences (Kymlicka 1995, 11). While there may be some similarity in the demands of minority groups in societies conflicted over issues of sovereignty, there is also a continuing demand for national separatism and independence, or a reciprocal struggle to deny them. 
This difference in interpretation of group rights throws up different forms of conflict that fundamentally permeate SPDCs. In London, conflict has arisen over the issue of whether the parade should receive public funding in favour of other groups in the capital city. In the weeks leading up to London’s first major SPDCs in 2002, a member of the centre-right Conservative Party, Graham Whitton, managed to garner token publicity for himself by stating that the GLA should not be sponsoring the Irish when no money was budgeted for the celebration of St George, England’s saint’s day. The English are the biggest community in London, the politician pointed out (Nagle 2005). Another more general critique of “multicultural celebrations”, such as SPDCs, derives from critics who argue that the “politics of difference” is illiberal in so far that it is inherently based on discrimination between groups. Multiculturalism, they argue, encourages competing ethnocultural aspirations and therefore fails to provide the common bonds of citizenship required to achieve social equality. The failure of multiculturalism to deliver rights and equality has perhaps been best observed in the equal-opportunities paradigm of British institutional multiculturalism, where the demand for “community” funding has ensured “a struggle between different groups to prioritise their cultural differences” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, 184). Instead of a political will to break “the vicious circle of mutually reinforcing exclusivities”, Bauman (2001, 103–4) argues that the “most potent forces conspire … to perpetuate the exclusivist trend”. The constant bickering over the allocation of resources allied to an emphasis on the “narcissism of minor differences” between “minority groups” works against the likelihood of collective action, hinders the opportunity to act collectively, and obscures the underlying issues of inequality and deprivation. 
In societies defined by a sovereignty contest, where there are incompatible claims to the territory by ethnonational groups, the forms of conflict that cultural performances like SPDCs are subject to are both similar and profoundly different. They are similar to the extent that detractors use the same types of criticism against the process of group-differentiated claim making. Graham and Nash (2006, 275) articulate this viewpoint: “in Northern Ireland, the attempt to deal with sub-state patterns of ethno-sectarian antagonism though principles of parity of cultural respect and esteem has inadvertently created a legitimating vocabulary of ‘culture’ and ‘cultural rights’ for antagonistic expressions of separatist difference”. Critics of group rights in Northern Ireland have accused this process of distorting the “democratic content of human rights conventions and legislation in support of perpetuating the sectarian division of all areas of political and social life” (James 2003). 
The main difference in the type of conflict that often occurs in the context of group-differentiated cultural claims in societies framed by ethnonational sovereignty contests is in the way public events are fought over by the respective ethnonational groups claiming sole ownership over the ritual. As noted earlier, in Northern Ireland St Patrick is recognised and cherished by both Unionists and Nationalists. However, this recognition and affiliation to shared cultural symbols, as Simon Harrison argues, does not automatically correlate to “a source of social cohesion” (Harrison 2002, 211). Instead, “shared cultural symbolism can give rise to competition over its ownership or use, and this competition can play an important role in defining ethnic boundaries” (ibid.). For Harrison (2002, 229), these “relationships of conflictual resemblance” occur because groups that may wish to be distinguished by creating boundaries between each other are in fact bound together in a common, historical, symbolic domain, and such a similarity can create mimetic antagonism.
The ethnonational conflict over proprietary rights to SPDCs in Belfast is fundamentally related to the wider struggle regarding which group merits sovereignty in Northern Ireland. It is hardly surprising that groups in ethnonational conflict will be competing over the same symbols and rituals. The struggle is especially acute when the contested symbol is mired in antiquity and relates to the historical origins of the disputed territory. By proclaiming an ancient affiliation with the symbol, both groups seek to legitimate their claims to the territory as well as its historical destiny. By linking itself to St Patrick, each group desires to gain what Smith (1991, 22–3) has called a “descent myth”, a narrative which inextricably connects the ethnie to a particular territory. Symbols rooted in ancient mythology have, as Cohen (1985, 99) notes, a particular efficacy for stating political legitimacy deriving from their “ahistorical character”: “myth is beyond time … it blocks off the past, making it impervious to rationalistic scrutiny”. Claiming Patrick, shrouded in myth, thus enables a group to confer “rightness on a course of action by extending to it the sanctity which enshrouds tradition and lore” (ibid.). 





This chapter has sought to compare and contrast SPDCs in the context of London and Belfast. In it I argue that we should differentiate celebrations in the two locations as either predominantly conforming to conflicts over pluralism or sovereignty. The progress of major SPDCs in London since 2002 should be seen as ostensibly conforming to a desire for pluralism. By demanding public recognition and validation for SPDCs in London, the London-Irish are striving to pluralise a supposedly once monolithic, homogeneous public sphere that excluded the cultures of minority groups such as the Irish. This celebration of difference has limits placed upon it, especially in terms of the UK government’s ongoing strategy of reformulating multiculturalism in terms of “unity through diversity … embracing heterogeneity, while recognising the importance of national solidarity” (Hesse 2000, 27). Multicultural spectacles, such as SPDCs, are encouraged to be as inclusive as possible by promoting intercultural relations and harmony. Diversity, in this synopsis, is tolerated only in so far as there is a concomitant commitment to the values of national cohesion.
The advance of SPDCs in Belfast since 1998 should instead be analysed in terms of the specificity of societies framed by clashes over sovereignty. There is a proviso to this though. The Belfast SPDCs are encouraged to engender cross-community inclusivity by providing a welcoming space for both Nationalists and Unionists. In addition, for Nationalists, like the London-Irish, the fact that SPDCs are now given public funding and public space is to be celebrated as the victory of cultural diversity within a state that once styled itself in terms of ethnic homogeneity. Nevertheless, SPDCs in Belfast are substantially different to those in London. They are not promoted as vehicles for establishing communal affiliation to a broad civic sense of belonging. This would be impossible, as argued earlier, in a society where the legitimacy of the state is the cause of violent conflict. Neither can SPDCs in Belfast necessarily be viewed as rites that facilitate cross-community tolerance and respect for diversity. Since both Nationalists and Unionists recognise and claim SPDCs as wholly their exclusive possession, events such as St Patrick’s Day are a matrix for bitter dispute.
That Belfast’s SPDCs have been prone to division does not preclude them playing an important role in conflict management and even peace-building. As Ross (2007) argues, public events, such as parades, can link interests between groups; alternatively, parades that are threatening can be redefined to be less threatening or exclusive as part of a constructive management process. Public events, however, do not act in a vacuum; they work best as an auxiliary to political movements on “the ground”. In other words, the de-escalation of heightened emotional feelings surrounding “cultural conflicts”, such as the flying of flags and parades, can help to smooth the path for opponents to enter into peace talks or new institutional arrangements. The key is not to force groups to abandon their cultural identities because they are wrong or provide erroneous accounts of history. This would only exacerbate feelings of inequality and fear; a more fruitful approach to conflict management requires that group differences are honestly acknowledged and addressed. Because ritual and symbolism, within limits, can be made malleable to different readings, new narratives can be developed “which do not directly challenge older ones, but which reframe them in more inclusive terms that deemphasise the emotional significance of differences between groups and identify shared goals and experiences” (Ross 2007, 31), such as civic values or a past of co-existence. For Ross, it is important that the “narratives” enshrined in ritual forms can be constructed so as to allow more nuanced views of the other side. Central to this dynamic, states Ross, is a mutual acknowledgement of the other community’s perceptions and concerns; such acknowledgement is often implicit rather than explicit, and may not involve acceptance of the other point of view. Such gestures do, though, require a sense of goodwill between the groups. In this way, speaking on St Patrick’s Day 1988, the Church of Ireland Primate Archbishop Robin Eames argued that St Patrick’s Day provides a unique opportunity for Nationalists and Unionists to forge reconciliation:
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